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DECISIONS
PROCEDURE-MUNICIPAL CouRT MAY ALrow EXAmwNAnON BEroRE TRiAL AND BILL or
PARTiCULARS 32 SUrnARY PnocEEDnG.-Reversing an order of the Municipal Court,
Borough of Manhattan, and overruling its own 1953 decision,, which followed a 1922
holding of the Appellate Division, Second Department, 2 a divided Appellate Term,
First Department, recently.held that the Municipal Court, in its discretion, may allow
an examination before trial and a bill of particulars in a summary proceeding to re-
cover real property, ample need otherwise being shown.
3
Plaintiff landlord corporation became the owner of a building and instituted sum-
mary proceedings under the Emergency Commercial Space Rent Control Law4 to
recover possession of realty from defendant statutory tenants, for the immediate and
personal use of the landlord's sole stockholder. Accompanying the service of respond-
ent's amended verified answer was a notice of examination before trial and a demand
for a bill of particulars. The landlord then moved for an order to vacate the notice
and the demand on the ground that neither was allowable in a summary proceeding
to recover real property. This motion was granted by the Municipal Court, but the
order was reversed by the Appellate Term.
The majority of the Appellate Term did not feel itself bound by past decisions
which had barred, as a matter of law, examinations before trial as being hostile to the
speed, promptness, and certainty of decision which the summary proceeding seeks to
attain.5 Justice Hofstadter, for the majority, termed such past refusal because of
undue delay as "largely illusory at the present time," 6 because the examintion date
and conduct are strictly within the control of the court. In support, Dorros v. Dorros
Bros.7 was cited to show that the court's attitude towards examinations before trial
has changed radically. In that case, the Appellate Division, Second Department, noted
that "the purpose of examinations before trial, like the trial itself, is to get out the
facts. As the trial should be an open meeting on the merits, both sides should have
a fair opportunity, in advance of trial, to garner evidence. Examinations before trial
are thus a useful procedure in facilitating preparation and expediting the trial."8 More-
over, as noted by the decision in the instant case, a summary proceeding to recover
real property is, nevertheless, a judicial proceeding where justice is not sacrificed for
speed. The Emergency Commercial Space Rent Control Law empowers the court to
stay the issuance of a warrant to dispossess after a final order has been entered "for
a period which shall not extend beyond six months following the time of com-
mencement of proceedings, or two months from the entry of a final order, whichever is
longer."9 Thus, concludes the majority, any delay, though prior to the entry of a final
order, which is within the period of permissible stay causes no prejudice, and should be
allowable, assuming ample need, within the discretion of the court. Nor is a bill of
1 Wiener Realty Co. v. Regent Brand Clothes, 204 Misc. 231, 122 N. Y. S. 2d 231
(App. T., ist Dept. 1953).
2 Dubowsky v. Goldsmith, 202 App. Div. 818, 195 N. Y. Supp. 67 (2d Dept.
1922).
3 42 West 15th Street Corp. v. Theodore S. Friedman, 208 Misc. 173, 143 N. Y. S.
2d 159 (App. T., ist Dept. 1955).
4 N. Y. EMERGENCY COMMaERCIAL SPACE RENT Co=RoL LAW § 8(d)(1) (1953).
5 See notes 1 and 2, supra.
6 See note 3, supra, at 124, 143 N. Y. S. 2d 159, 160.
-7 Marie Dorros, Inc. v. Dorros Bros., 274 App. Div. 11, 80 N. Y. S. 2d 25 (Ist
Dept. 1948).
8 Id. at 13, 80 N. Y. S. 25, 27.
9 N. Y. EmERGENCY COZXMERCIAL SPACE RENT CONTROL LAw, § 8(m) (1953).
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particulars opposed to the philosophy of a summary proceeding, adds the court. Be-
tween 1921 and 1939, the statute provided that where a landlord initiated summary
proceedings and the tenant interposed the defense of unreasonable and oppressive rent,
the landlord was specifically required to give a bill of particulars.1 0
Only the Wiener1 ' and Dubowsky' 2 cases, which the court in this case expressly
declined to follow, were squarely in point. In each, however, the court was divided
and reversed lower court orders granting examinations before trial. The Wiener case,
decided by the same court two years before, rested on the authority of the
Dubowsky case, a 1922 Appellate Division, Second Department decision. The former
held that under the Civil Practice Act 13 (as under the Emergency Commercial Space
Rent Control Law) 1 4 the court has no jurisdiction to stay a summary proceeding
until after a final order has been entered, and this precludes an examination before
trial. Justice Hofstadter had concurred in the Wiener case, but only on the basis that
there had been an unreasonable abuse of the lower court's due discretion, the Dubow-
sky case appearing to him persuasive but not controlling. In the Dubowsky case, the
expeditious object and nature of a summary proceeding had been the overriding con-
sideration, although the tenant's then-existing right to a bill of particulars when ac-
companied by the defense of unreasonable and oppressive rent under the Code of
Civil Procedure 15 was noted.
The Dorros case,1 6 cited by the tenant in the instant case, was an action brought
to enjoin defendant's use of a trade name in the same business field. There, the Appel-
late Division, First Department, unanimously affirmed a lower court order granting
an examination before trial, as a matter of court discretion, even to a party having
the negative of an issue as being "material and necessary in the prosecution or defense
of the action" within the meaning of the Civil Practice Act.'7 This rule has since
been adopted in New York by a 1952 amendment to the Rules of Civil Practice. 18
Prior to this amendment the First and Second Departments had been split on the
question, the First Department consistently holding the examination to be a matter
of court discretion,1 9 while the Second generally barred it as a matter of law.
20 The
Court of Appeals took judicial notice of this split, but declined to resolve it.21
In New York City, which comprises the First and Second Departments, there
are no Justice Courts, and no County Courts of civil jurisdiction. Only the Municipal
Courts possess original jurisdiction over summary proceedings to recover real prop-
erty.2 2 The procedure governing this judicial proceeding is set out in the Civil Prac-
IO N. Y. CODE Civ. PRoc. § 2231(2) (a), adopted as N. Y. Clv. PRAc. ACT § 1410,
repealed 1939.
11 See note 1, supra.
12 See note 2, spra.
13 N. y. CiV. PRAc. ACT § 1446.
14 See note 9, supra.
15 See note 10, supra.
16 See note 7, supra.
17 N. Y. Civ. PRAc. AT §§ 288, 308.
18 N. Y. RuLEs Crv. PRAc. Rule 121(a).
19 Alden v. O'Brien, 138 App. Div. 249, 122 N. Y. Supp. 910 (1st Dept. 1910);
Shaw v. Samly Realty Co., Inc., 201 App. Div. 433, 194 N. Y. Supp. 531 (1st Dept.
1922); Mann v. Luke, 272 App. Div. 19, 68 N. Y. S. 2d 313 (1st Dept. 1947),
appeal granted, 272 App. Div. 803, 71 N. Y. S. 2d 926 (1947).
20 Oshinsky v. Gumberg, 188 App. Div. 23, 176 N. Y. Supp. 406 (2d Dept. 1919).
21 Public National Bank of New York v. National City Bank of New York, 261
N. Y. 316, 185 N. E. 395 (1933).
22 N. Y. Civ. PRAc. ACT § 1413
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tice Act 2 3 and the Municipal Court Code.2 4 Neither contains any express reference
to examinations before trial or bills of particular. Yet the Civil Practice Act does
allow depositions, as a matter of court discretion, in special proceedings,25 though the
dicta in the Wiener26 and Dubowsky2 7 cases would seem to deny its applicability to
this type of summary proceeding.
The instant decision reflects the modem procedural policy trend towards liberal
flexibility governed by court discretion as typified by the Federal Rules.2 8 It is inter-
esting to note, in anticipating the future of this problem, the Public National Bank
case,2 9 in which a related procedural issue (whether having the affirmative burden of
proof is a prerequisite to an examination before trial in any action or special pro-
ceeding) was presented. There, the First and Second Departments were similarly
split, but the state's highest tribunal would not interfere with basic intra-Departmental
procedural autonomy. Only a subsequent legislative edict30 established a state-wide
rule in favor of flexibility.
MALPRACTicE-ACTION FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT NoT BARRED By Two-YEAR NEGri-
GEN E STATUTE OF LmrTArONs.-The Court of Appeals has ruled that. the complaint
in an action against a surgeon for breach of contract sufficiently stated a cause of
action in contract and was not barred by the two year Statute of Limitations1 which
governs actions for malpractice.2
Plaintiff employed the defendant, a licensed physician and surgeon, to perform an
operation which, in the defendant's opinion, was relatively minor. Defendant promised
plaintiff that he would be cured in one or two days, could leave the hospital in that
time, and immediately resume his occupation. The operation involved the removal
of a growth from plaintiff's body by tlhe application of electric sparks. During the
operation the defendant twice punctured one of plaintiff's organs causing the plaintiff
to undergo a major operation including opening the abdominal wall by incision.
Plaintiff was hospitalized for a month and was compelled to pay large sums of
money for medical and surgical treatment. Although plaintiff might have brought a
suit for malpractice he was precluded by the two-year Statute of Limitations, which
begins to run from the time the cause of action accrues and not from the time the
act of malpractice is discovered.3 Therefore plaintiff brought this action to recover
expenditures for nurses, medicine, loss of time from his occupation, and other damages
that ordinarily flow from a breach of a contract of this nature.
In discussing the relationship of physician and patient, the United States Su-
preme Court has said: "The duty of a physician or surgeon to bring skill and care
to the amelioration of the condition of his patient does not arise from contract, but
has its foundation in public considerations which are inseparable from the nature and
exercise of his calling; it is predicated by the law on the relation which exists between
23 Id., Art. 83, §§ 1410-47.
24 N. Y. Mitx. CT. CODE, § 28-a.
25 N. Y. Civ. PRAc. AcT § 308.
26 See note 1, supra.
27 See note 2, supra.
28 FED. R. Civ. P. 16.
29 See note 21, supra.
30 See note 18, supra.
1 N. Y. Civ. PRAC. ACT § 50(1).
2 Robins v. Finestone, 308 N. Y. 543, 127 N. E. 2d 330 (1955).
3 Conklin v. Draper, 254 N. Y. 620, 173 N. E. 892 (1930).
19561
NEW YORK LAW FORUM
physician and patient." 4 The doctrine is well settled in New York that the general
practitioner of medicine or of surgery does not, in the absence of special contract,
impliedly warrant the success of his treatment or operation, but only that he possesses,
and will carefully apply, such professional skill and learning as are ordinarily possessed
by general medical practitioners in the locality in which he practices. 5
Ordinarily a doctor undertakes only to give his best judgment and skill. o Ifow-
ever, a physician may bind himself, by contract, to effect a cure.7 When such a con-
tract is made (as in the instant case) and the physician fails to effect a cure, he is
liable for breach of contract even though he uses the highest possible degree of pro-
fessional skill.8
The causes of action in malpractice and breach of contract are dissimilar as to
theory, proof and damages recoverable. The action for malpractice is tortious in
nature and is based upon a failure to use the required medical skill, while the action
for breach of contract is predicated upon a failure to perform a special agreement.
Negligence is the basic element in a malpractice action and the damages recoverable
are for personal injuries including the pain and suffering which naturally flow from
the tortious act. In the contract action the damages are limited to the expenditures
for nurses, medicines, and of time.9
A cause of action for both malpractice and breach of contract may arise out of
the same transaction.1 0 In Conklin v. Draper,11 the defendant, a licensed surgeon,
failed to remove arterial forceps from within the plaintiff's abdominal cavity after
removing plaintiff's appendix. A second operation, performed by another surgeon
more than four years after the appendectomy, removed the forceps and cured the
plaintiff. The plaintiff's complaint contained causes of action for both malpractice and
breach of contract. After deciding that the cause of action for malpractice was
barred by the two year Statute of Limitations, it being decided that the Statute of
Limitations began to run from the time the appendectomy was performed, the Court
ruled that the second cause of action for breach of contract was not barred by the
statute. The Court relied upon a Massachusetts decision 12 which held that a surgeon
impliedly undertakes to use care in performing an operation and any act of mis-
conduct or negligence on his part in the service undertaken is a breach of his con-
tract which gives rise to a right of action in contract or tort. An early New York
casela had held that while a contract to cure a patient does involve the elimina-
tion of the patient's condition, the physician cannot be held responsible for sickness
which he agrees to end but does not end, unless he is guilty of malpractice.
It appears from the decision in the instant case that a cause of action for breach
of contract against a physician or surgeon exists when the physician expressly con-
tracts to cure the patient and fails to effect that cure regardless of the amount of
professional skill involved. It is significant that the court in this case points out that
nowhere in his complaint does the plaintiff seek to recover damages for pain and
suffering. Those damages would be recoverable in an action which sounds in negli-
4 National Savings Bank v. Ward, 100 U. S. 195, 25 L. Ed. 621 (1879).
5 Pike v. Honsinger, 155 N. Y. 201, 49 N. E. 760 (1898).
6 See note 3, supra.
7 Id.
8 Safian v. Aetna Life Insurance Co., 286 N. Y. 649, 36 N. E. 2d 692 (1940).
9 See note 2, supra.
I' See note 3, supra.
11 See note 5, supra.
12 Cappuci v. Baron, 266 Mass. 578, 165 N. E. 653 (1919).
13 Leighton v. Sargent, 27 N. Y. 460 (1853).
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gence. It is reasonable to infer from the decision that if the plaintiff had sought such
damages the court would have considered the case to sound in negligence. "The
damages sought are those suited to an action on contract, and help characterize the
complaint as one based upon a contract and not one based upon malpractice and
negligence."'
4
DEPORTATION-HEARING PROVISIONS OF ADAINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE AcT HELD TO SUPER-
SEDE PROVISIONS OF IMf IGRATION AND NATIONALITY AT-DEPORTATION FOR FELONY
ComnTTEr BEAoP ACT's PASSAGE UPH-.--The Supreme Court has held' that the
hearing provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act have been expressly superseded
by the Immigration and Nationality Act of 19522 in hearings for the deportation of
aliens previously convicted of one of the crimes specified in the Immigration and
Nationality Act. This decision affirmed lower holdings3 that the deportation order
was valid, and reaffirmed the Court's own previous decisions in recent deportation
cases4 prohibiting the application of the ex post facto clause5 to deportation proceed-
ings.
The petitioner, Marcello, was convicted of a violation of the Marihuana Tax Act
in 1938,6 and sentenced to imprisonment for one year. In 1952 the 'Immigration and
Nationality Act was passed, providing that an alien who has been convicted, at any
time, of a violation of any law or regulation which relates to the Government's con-
trol over narcotics may, upon the recommendation or "order of the Attorney General,
be deported." 7 The government thereafter instituted a proceeding under this provision
to deport Marcello.
At the hearing before the special inquiry officer, Marcello did not dispute the
fact of his prior conviction, but did object to the proceedings on the ground that
they violated due process8 and the Administrative Procedure Act, and that the ex post
facto clause precluded the retroactive application of the 1952 law to his case. These
objections were overruled by the hearing officer, and Marcello was, accordingly, or-
dered deported. Marcelio and his attorney were advised of their right to apply to the
Attorney General for the discretionary relief of suspension of deportation provided
for by the Immigration Act.9 At first, Marcello refused to do so, but later, he moved
to reopen the hearing on this ground, although he made no formal application for
suspension of deportation as set out in the act. This motion was denied, and on
appeal, the Board of Immigration Appeals affirmed the order of deportation.
The primary issue presented to the Supreme Court was whether the hearing
provisions of the Immigration Act of 1952 supersede those of the Administrative Pro-
cedure Act. The Immigration Act provides that in a hearing for the deportation of
an alien for the conviction of a crime made deportable by the Act, the special inquiry
officer may take the dual role of prosecutor or hearing officer as long as he does
14 See note 2, supra, at 547, 127 N. E. 2d 330, 334.
1 Marcello v. Bonds, 349 U. S. 302, 99 L. Ed. 658, 75 S. Ct. 757 (1955).
2 66 STAT. 209 (1952), 8 U. S. C. § 1252 (b) (1952).
3 113 F. Supp. 22 (E. D. La. 1953), aff'd 212 F. 2d 830 (5th Cir. 1954).
4 Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U. S. 580, 96 L. Ed. 586, 72 S. Ct. 512 (1948);
Galvan v. Press, 347 U. S. 522, 74 S. Ct. 737, 99 L. Ed. 911 (1953).
5 U. S. CoNsT. art. I § 9.
6 Marihuana Tax Act, 53 STAT. 280 (1938), 26 U. S. C. § 2591 (1952).
7 66 STAT. 204, § 241 (a) (11) (1952), 8 U. S. C. § 1251 (a) (11) (1952).
8 U. S. CONST. art. V.
9 66 STAT. 214, § 244 (a) (5) (1952), 8 U. S. C. § 1254 (2) (5) (1952).
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not hear cases in which he has previously functioned as an investigator or prose-
cutor.10 The Administrative Procedure Act provided that the hearing officer in a
deportation proceeding could neither be responsible to nor under the supervision of
those engaged in investigative or prosecuting functions. 11
The Administrative Procedure Act was passed in 1946, and in the Wong Yang
Sung12 case, the Court held that it was applicable to deportation hearings. However,
six months later, Congress passed the Supplemental Appropriations Act of 1951,13
which provided that the Administrative Procedure Act should not govern the pro-
cedure to be used in deportation hearings. However, in 1952 the Immigration Act
was passed, which apparently reapplied the Administrative Procedure Act to deporta-
tion hearings, through its repetition of the same pertinent provisions, and by operation
of the specific provision of the Administrative Procedure Act that any supersession
of its provisions must be express.' 4 The Court held that although there was no
magical password in the Immigration Act, still there was such express supersession by
virtue of "legislative history .. .and the direction in the statute that the method
therein prescribed shall be the sole and exclusive procedure for deportation proceed-
ings." 15
From the detailed coverage of the same subject matter dealt with in the hearing
provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act, it was made quite clear that Congress,
in the Immigration Act, was setting up a specialized administrative procedure applica-
ble to deportation hearings, drawing freely on the similar provisions and adapting
them to the peculiar needs of the deportation process.' 6 By looking to the framework
of the Immigration Act, the Court determined that Congress intended to 'use the
Administrative Procedure Act only as a "model", and that where a deviation appeared,
Congress intended that the deviation and not the general model should apply.' 7
Because Marcello had been convicted under the Marihuana Tax Act before that
conviction became a ground for deportation, a question arose as to whether the pro-
ceeding was a violation of the ex post facto provision of the Constitution, in that the
punishment for the crime was being increased after its commission by him. The ex
post facto clause of the Constitution has been interpreted as prohibiting penal legisla-
tion which imposes or increases criminal punishment for conduct lawful previous to
its enactment.18 However, deportation has been consistently classified through judicial
decisions as a civil rather than a criminal procedure,19 and in a recent case, the
Supreme Court held that "whatever might have been said at an earlier date for
applying the ex post facto clause, it has been the unbroken rule of this court that it
has no application to deportation. '20 The Court found no special reason in the case
1o 66 STAT. 209, § 242 (b) (1952), 8 U. S. C. § 1252 (b) (1952).
11 60 STAT. 237, § 5 (c) (1946), 5 U. S. C. § 1001 (1952).
12 Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U. S. 33, 94 L. Ed. 616, 70 S. Ct. 445
(1949).
13 64 STAT. 1048 (1950), 5 U. S. C. § 1001 (1952).
14 60 STAT. 244, § 12 (1946), 5 U. S. C. § 1001 (1952).
15 349 U. S. 302, 309, 99 L. Ed. 658, 665, 75 S. Ct. 757, 762 (1955).
16 349 U. S. 302, 308, 99 L. Ed. 658, 666, 75 S. Ct. 757, 761 (1955).
17 See note 15, supra.
18 Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall. 386, 1 L. Ed. 648 (U. S. 1798).
19 Johannessen v. United States, 225 U. S. 227, 32 S. Ct. 613, 56 L. Ed. 1066
(1911); Fung Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U. S. 698, 13 S. Ct. 1016, 37 L. Ed.
905 (1892) ; Bugajewitz v. Adams, 228 U. S. 585, 33 S. Ct. 607, 57 L. Ed. 978 (1914) ;
Bilokumsky v. Tod, 263 U. S. 149, 448 S. Ct. 54, 68 L. Ed. 221 (1923); Mahler v.
Eby, 264 U. S. 32, 44 S. Ct. 283, 68 L. Ed. 549 (1923).




at bar to overturn its precedents 2 1 pertaining to this long-settled question, and there-
fore merely reiterated this rule.
While our immigration laws have followed a logical pattern in their development,
they have been restricted mainly to the exclusion rather than the expulsion of aliens.
Actually, it was not until the passage of the Immigration Act of 1917,22 and three
subsequent acts,2 3 that Congress established a definite legislative trend for the expul-
sion of undesirable aliens from the United States. The Alien Registration Act of 1924
was limited in application to specific classes of undesirable aliens, and the Subversive
Control Act of 1925, was designed to strengthen security screening of aliens. It was
not until the passage of the 1952 Immigration Act that the number of grounds for
which undesirable aliens could be deported was increased. Furthermore, it greatly
strengthened the power of the administrative agencies whose duty it is to administer
our immigration laws and to deport undesirable aliens. It also increased the power
of the federal courts to aid the administrative agencies in the exercise of their func-
tions.
This decision confirms the results of earlier cases by denying the protection of the
ex post facto clause to aliens whom the government seeks to deport. Further, the
court, in interpreting a statute which gives the agencies concerned a greater latitude
in their choice of grounds for deportation, appears to have given judicial sanction to a
greater latitude, as well, in their methods of conducting hearings.
EvmECE--NEw EVIDENCE Orraan As BASIS POR NEW TRIAL HELD TO Ba MERELY
CUmULATIVE, AND NOT LIKELY TO CHANGE VERDIcT.In denying defendant's motion
for a new trial after a conviction for murder in the first degree, the Court of Appeals
of the State of New York recently held that newly discovered evidence must be of
such a character that it would probably result in a change in the verdict. The court
further held that the evidence must not be cumulative and that failure to produce
such evidence at the original trial must not have resulted from want of due diligence.'
In the instant case the defendant was convicted primarily on the basis of testi-
mony of two witnesses placing the defendant at- the scene both before and after the
crime was committed and on a dying declaration of the victim. At the trial the de-
fendant introduced evidence tending to show that he was elsewhere when the crime was
committed and that the substance of the dying declaration was untrue, but he did not
testify in his own behalf. An initial appeal2 was unsuccessful. Subsequently, the de-
fendant moved for a new trial on the basis of newly discovered evidence. This mo-
tion was denied and it was from this denial that the present appeal was taken. The
newly discovered evidence offered for this appeal was made up chiefly of evidence
tending to discredit the dying declaration. This evidence took two forms, one tending
to show that the victim was unable to talk, the other tending to show that the wit-
ness who reported the dying declaration did not speak with the victim.
In the State of New York the power to grant an order for a new trial on the
grounds of newly discovered evidence is statutory, expressed in the Code of Criminal
Procedure.3 A motion for a new trial on such grounds, after the conviction has been
21 Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, note 4, supra; Galvan v. Press, note 4, supra.
22 39 STAT. 874 (1917), 5 U. S. C. § 342 (1952).
23 40 STAT. 559 (1918), 22 U. S. C. § 226 (1952); 40 STAT. 1012 (1918), 8 U. S. C.
§ 137 (1952); 41 STAT. 395 (1920), 43 U. S. C. § 1173 (1952).
1 People v. Salemi, 309 N. Y. 208 (1955).
2 People v. Salemi, 306 N. Y. 863, 118 N. E. 2d 917 (1954).
3 N. Y. CODE CRaI. PROC. § 465.
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affirmed by the Court of Appeals, is addressed to the discretion of the court and may
only be granted where the requirements of the statute have been observed.4 The
court in the instant case found no such abuse of discretion which would warrant a
reversal.
The statute5 requires that the evidence be of such nature that, if it had been
received before, the verdict would probably have been different. This is a matter
within the discretion of the court, a principle early recognized in the courts of New
York.6 At the same time it was recognized that new cumulative evidence made in-
effective by the present statute, was improper as a basis for granting a new trial.
Want of diligence is also a statutory bar to the granting of a new trial which
has its roots in the common law.7 In People v. Hovey,8 the court refused to grant a
new trial noting that the lack of diligence was not on the part of counsel but on the
part of the defendant. In the case of People v. O'Brien9 lack of diligence on the part
of defendant's counsel did not bar a new trial. Rather, it was deemed a valid cause
for granting a new trial.
A further condition is that the evidence must not be cumulative. It is a gen-
eral rule that even in an original trial, cumulative witnesses may be excluded at the
discretion of the court.10 For example, the Draft Uniform Evidence Act" limits ex-
pert witnesses to three in number unless permission of the court is granted to intro-
duce more. Of course, corroborating evidence is very important. It has been held
in New York that where corroborating evidence was improperly refused admission it
was improper for the trial court to allow the jury to question the accused's credibility.
The law on the subject of interpretation of the applicable statute is summarized in
People v. Priori,12 where it was emphasized that the newly discovered evidence must
not merely impeach or contradict the evidence originally submitted.
In the instant case the new evidence which was offered tended to impeach or
contradict the existence of a dying declaration, but was not of the character that
would tend to impeach or discredit the declarant. Such evidence showing the bad
character,13 improper state of mind,14 conviction for a crime,15 or prior inconsistent
statements1 6 of the declarant has been held to be admissible. Impeachment of a per-
son claiming to be a witness to the dying declaration by testimony showing that he
was not present at the time alleged has been allowed. 17 The court in this case was pre-
sented with the question of whether evidence of this character is cumulative, and
answered this question affirmatively. Under the existing statute the court felt com-
pelled to deny the defendant's motion on the ground that this evidence would not have
affected the results of the trial.
4 People v. Farini, 125 Misc. 300, 209 N. Y. Supp. 532 (Sup. Ct. Kings Co. 1925).
5 See note 3, supra.
6 People v. Giordano, 144 Misc. 108, 259 N. Y. S. 178 (Bronx Co. Ct. 1932);
People v. Luciano, 164 Misc. 167, 299 N. Y. Supp. 132 (Sup. Ct. Bronx Co. 1937);
Guyot v. Butts, 4 Wend. 579 (N. Y. Sup. Ct. 1830).
7 People v. Verinilyea, 7 Cow. 369 (N. Y. Ct. Errors 1827).
8 People v. Hovey, 30 Hun 354 (1st Dep't 1883).
9 People v. O'Brien, 110 App. Div. 26, 96 N. Y. S. 1045 (2d Dep't 1905).
10 See 7 BENTHAm, RATiONALE OF JuDICIAL EVIDENCE 531 (New York, 1827).
1 DRAft EVIDENCE AcT 1938, § 8.
12 People v. Barberi, 149 N. Y. 256, 43 N. E. 635 (1896).
'3 People v. Priori, 164 N. Y. 459, 58 N. E. 635 (1900).
14 Carver v. United States, 164 U. S. 694, 17 S. Ct. 228, 41 L. Ed. 602 (1897).
15 Nordgren v. People, 211 Ill. 425, 71 N. E. 1042 (1904).
16 People v. Ricken, 242 App. Div. 106, 273 N. Y. S. 470 (3d Dep't 1934).
17 State v. Lodge, 9 :Roust. (Del.) 542, 33 Atl. 312 (1892); State v. Kacar, 74
Mont. 269, 240 Pac. 365 (1925).
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The dissents rely, in part, upon the premise that the jury might have been per-
suaded by the new evidence. The defense did not put the existence of a dying declara-
tion into issue at the trial; only after the new evidence was discovered did this ques-
tion arise. Should it not then be sufficient ground for a new determination of fact?
Even if the evidence should be technically classified as cumulative, should not the hold-
ing of Page v. Krekeyl s be given weight, that so long as facts testified to are not con-
clusivelv established or admitted, they are still open to further proof?
The statute construed in this case1 9 states that cumulative evidence is not "new
evidence" of the kind required as a ground for a motion for a new trial, and the trial
court determines whether the evidence is or is not cumulative. Undoubtedly the re-
strictions in the statute are necessary in order that the judicial process may not be
extended indefinitely. However, in its present form, the statute says, in effect, that
evidence which is cumulative can never persuade a jury. The strong dissents in the
instant case contain cogent arguments for the enactment of a statute more liberal in
its language than the present provision.
2 0
FEDERAL PROCEDURE-SECTION 1404(a) OF JUDICIARY CODE HELD TO BROADEN DISCRETION
or DISTRICT COURTS IN ORDERING TRANSFER OF CivIL ACTIONS RATHER THAN MERELY
CODIFYING DOCTRINE OF FORUM NON CONVENIN.-In Norwood v. Kirkpatrick,
1 
the
Supreme Court has held that Section 1404(a) of Title 28, United States Code, broadens
the discretion of the federal district courts in the transfer of civil actions, and is not
mcrely a codification of the doctrine of forum non conveniens.
Three dining car employees who had been injured in the derailment of defend-
ant's interstate train in South Carolina, sued under the Federal Employers Liability
Act 2 in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. De-
fendant railroad filed motions to dismiss or in the alternative to transfer the cases to
the Eastern District of South Carolina. The District Court denied the motions to dis-
miss, but granted the motion to transfer the case to the South Carolina Federal Court.
The plaintiffs filed applications for mandamus to have set aside the District Court's
order of transfer. They conceded that such orders are not appealable, as had been
held in All States Freight v. ModarellV and more recently in Riverbank v. Hardwood
4
(regarding an order denying a motion to dismiss the action for improper venue). But
they cited in support of their position, the dictum of the All States Freight case, which
although denying the instant application, alluded to a policy5 set forth in Gulf Research
and Development Co. v. Leahy,6 to the effect that where "extraordinary circumstances"
exist,7 interlocutory review by mandamus lies. However, the Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit denied the applications and the Supreme Court granted certiorari. 8
In its opinion the Supreme Court approved the District Court's following of the
18 Page v. Krekey, 137 N. Y. 307, 33 N. E. 311 (1893).
19 See note 1, supra.
20 See note 3, supra.
1 349 U. S. 29, 75 S. Ct. 544, 99 L. Ed. 461 (1955).
2 45 U. S. C. § 56 (1952).
3 196 F. 2d 1010 (3d Cir. 1952).
4 220 F. 2d 465 (7th Cir. 1955).
5 See note 3, supra at 1012.
1; 193 F. 2d 302 (3d Cir. 1951), aft'd, 3441 U. S. 861, 73 S. Ct. 102, 97 L. Ed. 668
(1952).
7 Id. at 304.
8 348 U. S. 870, 75 S. Ct. 106, 99 L. Ed. 49 (1954).
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All States Freight case0 holding that the statute does broaden the discretion of the
District Court as exercised under the doctrine of forum non conveniens. This doctrine
permits dismissal of a case because the forum chosen by the plaintiff is inappropriate
and inconvenient.' 0 Once dismissed, the action must be renewed in another jurisdic-
tion, where, of course, the statute of limtations has been running since the cause arose.
As a consequence, the application of the doctrine has been strictly limited.1
In 1948, Congress enacted Section 1404(a) of title 28, United States Code, whidn
provides: "For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a
district court may transfer any civil action to any other district or division where
it might be brought." The statute, according to Mr. Justice Minton, limits the privi-
lege of the plaintiff to sue in the forum of his choosing, and its purpose is to grant
a broad power of transfer to District Courts, for the convenience of parties and for
other reasons, regardiess of the appropriateness of the dismissal or transfer under the
doctrine of forum non conveniens. 12 Under the statute, the order transferring the
action from one District Court to another does not end the action, but preserves it
against the running of the statute of limitations and for all purposes.
In a recent decision' 3 interpreting the statute, it was held that the federal Dis-
trict Court abused its discretion in denying a motion of the defendant railroad to
transfer a death action from Illinois to Iowa, where the fatal accident occurred, for
convenience of parties and witnesses and in the interest of justice. In determining
whether the case should be transferred to another district, held the Court, the interests
of the parties to the law suit, as well as the interests of society in general, should be
considered.14
However, the decision upon which the Supreme Court relied most extensively to
show that Congress intended to do more than just codify the existing law on forum
non conveniens was its own ruling in Ex parte Collett.15 There, the Court had held
that in enacting Section 1404(a) Congress was revising as well as codifying the com-
mon-law rule of forum norr conveniens, and substituting the remedy of transfer for
the previously existing remedy of dismissal, where the action was not brought in the
appropriate forum.
In the dissent, Mr. Justice Clark foresaw a possibility, of conflict, confusion and
injustice if plaintiffs were allowed to "shop" for a forum under Section 1404(a), a
result which, he felt, would follow if the majority opinion's construction of the statute
were followed. However, it is to be noted that Section 6 of the FELA extended plain-
tiff's choice of forum to the extreme limits of the defendant's business operations. It
would, therefore, seem that the majority holding should, if anything, cut down the
amount of "shopping" once the trial court exercises a broader discretion in granting
a change of venue.
A stronger argument made by the dissent is that the majority position might
work to cut down plaintiff's rights under Section 6 of the FELA. There is no ques-
9 See note 3, supra.
10 Hayes v. Chicago, R. I. & P. R., 79 F. Supp. 821, 824 (D. Minn. 1948).
11 See note 3 supra, at 1011.
12 Ibid.; Jiffy Lubricator Co. v. Steward Warner Corp., 177 F. 2d 360 (4th Cir.
1948).
13 Chicago, R. I. & P. R. v. Igoe, 220 F. 2d 299 (7th Cir. 1955).
14 Jiffy Lubricator Co. v. Stewart Warner Corp., note 12 supra, at 363.
15 337 U. S. 55, 69 S. Ct. 944, 93 L. Ed. 1207 (1949); see also, Schoen v. Moun-
tain Producers Corp., 170 F. 2d 707 (3d Cir. 1948); Berger v. Proctor and Gamble
Defense Corp., 172 F. 2d 541 (5th Cir. 1949); United States v. National City Lines,




tion that the choice of forum has been limited by this ruling, but on the other hand,
a defendant now has the opportunity of a transfer where a need presents itself.
Formerly, the District Court could only dismiss an action on the ground of incon-
venience. This was a right which trial courts exercised with restraint because of the
running of the statute of limitations.
Two Supreme Court cases, decided before the statute was enacted by Congress,
were discussed in the dissent to support the position that the statute is merely a re-
statement of the doctrine of forum non conveniens. In Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert,'8 the
court held that the plaintiff's choice of forum should not be disturbed unless the
balance is strongly in favor of the defendant. In Koster v. Lumberman's Mutual
Casualty Co.,17 it was decided that in any balancing of conveniences, a showing of
convenience by a plaintiff suing in his home forum will normally outweigh the in-
convenience the defendant may have shown. These decisions were regarded in the
dissent as having influenced Congress only to codify the old doctrine which was to
continue as the prevailing rule.
Three recent Supreme Court cases were cited by the dissent as interpreting the
statute as a codification of the doctrine, although none was referred to in the majority
opinion. These omissions may have been made because the language relied on in the
first appears to have been dictum,' 8 the action in the second was not brought under
Section 6 of the FELA,19 and the language relied on in the instant case was cited
only in the dissent in the third.;o
Under this opinion, the District Court now has a broader discretion than formerly
under the doctrine of forum non conveniens. Should Congress disagree with this
judicial construction of the statute, it must express its disagreement by future legisla-
tive revision.
CRIMINAL LAw-CoNvicTIoN FOR HOMICIDE ARISING FROM VIOLATION OF MULTIPLE
DWELLING LAW UPHELD DESPITE LACK OF NOTICE TO OWNER OF VIOLATION.-
The attention of the popular press has several times in recent years been focused on
the problem of the tenement owner who maintains his property in violation of the
Multiple Dwelling Law and thereby occasions the death of residents.' In a recent
New York case,2 decedents were trapped in defendant's burning building which lacked
the fire protection required by statute.3 Defendant was convicted of the crime of
manslaughter in the first degree: "homicide . . . committed without a design to effect
16 330 U. S. 501, 67 S. Ct. 839, 91 L. Ed. 1055 (1946).
17 330 U. S. 518, 67 S. Ct. 888, 91 L. Ed. 1067 (1946).
18 Pope v. Atlantic Coast Line R. R., 345 U. S. 379, 383, 73 S. Ct. 749, 754,
97 L. Ed. 1094, 1098 (1952); "Section 1404(a) makes the doctrine applicable to FELA
cases brought in federal courts and provides for the transfer of such actions to a more
convenient forum."
19 Korotest Mfg. Co. v. C-O-Two Fire Equip. Co., 342 U. S. 180, 186, 72 S. Ct.
219, 225, 96 L. Ed. 200, 203 (1952): "If the manufacturer is joined as an unwilling
defendant in a forum non conveniens, he has available upon an appropriate showing
the relief provided by Section 1404(a) of the Judiciary Code."
20 Wells v. Simonds Abrasive Co., 345 U. S. 514, 522, 73 S. Ct. 856, 860, 97
L. Ed. 1211, 1218 (1952) (dissent): "The purpose was to adopt for federal courts
the principles of forum non conveniens."
1 See generally, Wilner, Unintentional Homicide in the Commission of an Unlawful
Act, 87 U. PA. L. REv. 811 (1939), and cases cited therein.
2 People v. Nelson, 309 N. Y. 231, 128 N. E. 2d 391 (1955).
3 N.- Y. MuLT. DWELLING L. §§ 187, 188, 189; violation as misdemeanor, § 304.
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death'by a person engaged in committing or attempting to commit, a misdemeanor,
affecting the person or property, either of the person killed or of another,"
4 and of
manslaughter in the second degree: "homicide . . . committed without a design to
effect death . . . by . . . culpable negligence."5 The Appellate Division struck out
the conviction of manslaughter in the second degree, and the Court of Appeals
affirmed the conviction as modified.
Defendant, a former tenant seventy-one years of age, took title to the premises
under threat of eviction a year and a half before the fire. He had not been personally
notified that the defective conditions constituted violations, but testimony tended to
prove that he was aware of the physical conditions. The trial court withheld from
the jury the defense of complete ignorance of the underlying misdemeanors on the
ground that specific criminal intent was not prerequisite to defendant's guilt. The owner
contended that this was error; that the jury should have been allowed to consider
the issue of culpable negligence in the absence of actual notice. The Court of Appeals
rejected this contention.
An analysis of the cases seems to indicate a hesitancy on the part of the New
York courts to impose liability for homicide flowing from purely statutory crimes.
In People v. Grieco,6 defendant, while intoxicated, recklessly drove his auto so as to
cause the death of a human being. A conviction of first degree manslaughter under
subdivision 2 was set aside since defendant neither intentionally hit the deceased nor
saw her before the instant of contact. The Court thus held that prior knowledge was es-
sential, and distinguished the misdemeanors involved,7 as affecting society in general,
from those affecting a particular person or property. Explicitly disapproved was an
earlier case8 wherein a conviction was had under similar circumstances.
The Court of Appeals in the instant case relied heavily on People v. Alexander,
9
in which defendant was convicted of manslaughter in the first and second degrees for
the death of seven persons in a tenement which he maintained without the prescribed
safety equipment. Defendant argued that his building was not of the type falling
within the purview of the law but the jury was charged that as far as the mis-
demeanor was concerned, ignorance and mistake of law did not excuse. The highest
court unanimously affirmed the conviction, reasoning that although defendant did
not intend the violation, he clearly intended the act which constituted it. Similar
is the case 10 of a factory owner who was convicted under subdivision 1 when his em-
ployees died in a fire after his failure to maintain unlocked doors and doors which
opened outward, resulting in a misdemeanor
1 ' in violation of the Labor Law.
12
"Felonious intention, as an element of the homicide, is supplied by the intention
to do the unlawful act of which the homicide is a consequence. The intent is trans-
ferred by implication of the law. It is not necessary that the slayer shall have in-
tended to violate the law in order that he may be found guilty; but he must have
intended to commit an act which is a violation of the law."' 3 The owner admitted
4 N. Y. PENA L. § 1050, subd. 1.
5 Id., § 1052, subd. 3.
6 266 N. Y. 48, 193 N. E. 634 (1934), rev'g, 241 App. Div. 790, 270 N. Y. S.
1020 (1st Dep't 1934) ; motion to dismiss denied, 265 N. Y. 504, 193 N. E. 292 (1934).
7 N. Y. VEH. & TR. L. §§ 58; 70, subd. 5.
8 People v. Darragh, 141 App. Div. 408, 126 N. Y. Supp. 522 (2d Dep't 1910),
aff'd, 203 N. Y. 527, 96 N. E. 1124 (1911).
9 293 N. Y. 870, 59 N. E. 2d 451 (1944).
M' People v. Diamond, 95 Misc. 114, 160 N. V. Supp. 603 (King, Co. Ct. 1916).
11 N. Y. PENAL L. § 1275.
12 N. Y. LABOR L. § 271, subd. 3; § 272, subd. 3.
13 26 Am. JUR. Homicide § 188, pp. 281, 282; 40 C. J. S. Homicide, § 57, pp. 920,
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the possibility of his culpable negligence in having allowed the "act", but denied an
intention to have committed it.
A distinction is made by some courts between acts merely mala prohibita and
those mala in se. Thus, where defendant drove his wagon through a toll gate in an
alleged effort to escape payment of the toll, and so caused the death of the keeper,
"the act of the defendant in making this attempt in the exercise of due care, was, at
its worst, merely nzalum prohibitum, and was in itself devoid of dangerous tendency,
and therefore was not criminal. The mere unlawfulness of the act does not, in this
class of cases, per se, render the doer of it liable, in criminal law, for all the undesigned
and improbable consequences of it."14 Accordingly, under this view, a question of
fact remains for the jury. Of like import is Thiede v. State,1 5 where defendant sold
intoxicating liquor to the deceased in violation of statute. The Supreme Court of
Nebraska held that an act merely malum prohibitum, unaccompanied by negligence,
is insufficient to supply the wrongful intent essential to criminal homicide.' 6
In regard to the statutes which most states, including New York, have enacted,
providing that homicide committed in the course of a misdemeanor, or other "unlawul
act" less than a felony, is manslaughter, the New York Law Revision Commission
commented that "courts, called upon to construe these, have evinced a uniform reluc-
tance to interpret the provision literally, and manage to read into it limitations which
materially modify its rigor .... By far the greatest number assert ... [that the mis-
demeanor involved] ...must be malum in se, and that an act only malum prohibitum
resulting in homicide is insufficent to subject the wrongdoer to liability for man-
slaughter."17
In view of the authorities considered, the instant decision seems to define some-
what literally the legislative intent regarding violations of the Multiple Dvieling Law.
921; People v. Hubbard, 64 Cal. App. 27, 220 Pac. 315 (1923); Pumphrey v. State,
84 Neb. 636, 122 N. W. 19 (1909); State v. Welch, 37 N. M. 549, 25 P. 2d 211 (1933);
People v. Barnes, 182 Mich. 179, 148 N. W. 400 (1914).
14 Estelle v. State, 51 N. J. L. 182, 17 Atl. 118 (1889).
15 106 Neb. 48, 182 N. W. 570 (1921), 15 A. L. R. 244 (1922).
16 People v. Pavlic, 227 Mich. 562, 199 N. W. 373 (1924); Potter v. State, 162
Ind. 213, 70 N. E. 129 (1904); State v. Horton, 139 N. C. 588, 51 S. E. 945 (1905);
Commonwealth v. Adams, 114 Mass. 323, 19 Am. Rep. 362 (1873); People v. Pearne,
118 Cal. 154, 50 Pac. 376 (1897); State v. Trollinger, 162 N. C. 618, 77 S. E. 957
(1913).
17 REPORT OF THE "NEW YORK LAW REvIsION CoM IssIoN, 663-664 (1937).
19561
